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NOTE
TROUBLE WITH NAMES:
COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND A NEW
APPROACH TO FOOD PRODUCT
LABEL REGULATION
WILLIAM CUSACK*

INTRODUCTION
The commonly understood meaning of “skim milk” is “milk from
which the cream has been taken.”1 Mary Lou Wesselhoeft, the owner
of a small dairy creamery in Florida, began selling skim milk, the
natural dairy product with the cream removed, in 2010.2 In 2012,
however, Mary Lou received a stop order from the Florida Department
of Agriculture and Consumer Services (“DACS”).3 Florida law
prohibited the sale of products labeled “milk” that is not Grade “A,”
requiring that the Vitamin A content lost in the skimming process be
replaced.4 DACS asked Mary Lou to add Vitamin A to her skim milk
or to stop selling it.5 Mary Lou disliked the idea of injecting artificial
additives into her dairy products, so she chose to cease selling.6 She
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1. Skim
Milk,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https//www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/skim%20milk (Sept. 27, 2021).
2. Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that
a prohibition on the use of the term “skim milk” to describe milk without the required regulatory
Vitamin A content violated the First Amendment).
3. Id.; see also Censored in Florida: Creamery Owner Sues to End Labeling Censorship,
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, https://ij.org/case/florida-skim-milk/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021) (arguing
the stop order was an example of state censorship).
4. Ocheesee Creamery, 851 F.3d at 1231.
5. Id. at 1232.
6. See Censored in Florida: Creamery Owner Sues to End Labeling Censorship, supra note
3 (discussing Mary Lou’s “all-natural philosophy” as a reason to refuse injecting Vitamin A into
her milk).
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attempted to reach an agreement with the State to rename the product,
but her attempts failed.7 After the discussions over product naming
proved unsuccessful, Mary Lou filed a First Amendment lawsuit
against the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture.8
The Supreme Court has recognized First Amendment protection
for “commercial speech” since 1975.9 Commercial speech refers to
communication aimed at “promoting the sale of commercial services
or products.”10 Commercial speech doctrine seeks to balance advertiser
interest in speech, consumer interest in information, and society’s
interest that “economic decisions in the aggregate be intelligent and
well-informed.”11 Regulations and compulsory disclosures of
commercial speech play a part in ensuring consumers are wellinformed.12 For example, mandatory health warnings on cigarette
packages fall within the scope of commercial speech.13 In Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York,14 the Supreme Court set forth a four-part test to determine
whether a regulation on commercial speech is valid, focusing on the
determination of “whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive

7. See Ocheesee Creamery, 851 F.3d at 1232. (discussing various proposals by Florida that
Mary Lou rejected, such as naming her milk “imitation milk product,” “Non-Grade ‘A’ Milk
Product, Natural Milk Vitamins Removed,” and that Florida would not allow her to use “skim
milk” in the label).
8. Id.; see Censored in Florida: Creamery Owner Sues to End Labeling Censorship, supra
note 3 (describing how Mary Lou joined with the Institute for Justice in its First Amendment
suit).
9. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding that First Amendment protection
is not lost because the speech is in the form of paid commercial advertising); see also Carl
Wiersum, No Longer Business as Usual: FDA Exceptionalism, Commercial Speech, and the First
Amendment, 73 FOOD AND DRUG L. J. 486, 489 (2018) (discussing the increased protection
afforded by commercial speech doctrine and proposing the FDA change its approach to
addressing First Amendment concerns to further its regulatory goals).
10. Martin H. Redish, First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432 (1971) (discussing restrictions on
commercial speech and arguing for the expansion of commercial speech protections).
11. Wiersum, supra note 9, at 489.
12. Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer Right to Know,
58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 428 –29 (2016) (arguing that compelled commercial speech should not be
viewed as separate from commercial speech generally and that mandatory disclosures and
labeling requirements should be supported by a substantial government interest).
13. Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the Constitutional
Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 515 (2014) (setting forth an analytical
approach to consumer rationality relating to emotional and graphic communications in the realm
of commercial speech).
14. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

CUSACK_FINALNOTE_12.21.21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TROUBLE WITH NAMES

12/26/2021 11:02 PM

121

than is necessary to serve that interest.”15 Unfortunately, many cases
are not straightforward, and courts have had trouble defining the extent
of permissible commercial speech regulations. Currently, there is “flux
and uncertainty of the First Amendment doctrine of commercial
speech,” as well as conflict between circuits grappling with disclosure
requirements.16
Ocheesee Creamery exemplifies the difficulties courts have had
with the commercial speech doctrine. Both the Northern District of
Florida and the Eleventh Circuit struggled to draw a line determining
when commercial speech is inherently misleading,17 and when a
regulation becomes too extensive.18 Such difficulty and disagreement
over commercial speech is not uncommon.19 Other courts are
consistently inconsistent when deciding what food product labels are
misleading, what constitutes a governmental interest, what regulations
directly advance a governmental interest, and what regulations are too
extensive.20
The confusion surrounding the commercial speech doctrine applies
to all commercial products, and food labeling is no exception.
Lawmakers continue to pass regulations that are unnecessary or
nonsensical.21 Regulators continue to enforce these regulations, even if
15. Id. at 566 (1980) (holding that a regulation prohibiting advertising by a utility company
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
16. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that a rule which
compelled certain manufacturers and business to disclose that their products were not “DRC
conflict free” violated the First Amendment).
17. See Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2017)
(rejecting the Northern District of Florida’s reasoning that differing from the State’s definition of
“skim milk” is inherently misleading).
18. See id. at 1233, 1240 (the District Court found that the State’s regulation passed scrutiny,
whereas the Eleventh Circuit found that the State failed to show its remedy was “not more
extensive than necessary”).
19. See Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 53, 54 (2016) (explaining that disagreements are common because “legal
doctrine – and legal scholarship – in this area remains remarkably underdeveloped”).
20. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding the
governmental interest in informing the public about a product’s characteristics insubstantial);
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 760 F.3d 18, 23–25 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding a substantial
governmental interest in informing consumers about the characteristics of products they wished
to purchase); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding a ban on
advertising liquor prices violated the First Amendment because the State did not show that the
ban adequately advanced its interest in promoting temperance); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. State of
R.I., 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a ban on advertising liquor prices directly advanced
the State’s interest of promoting temperance).
21. See Kelsey Piper, Mississippi Will No Longer Ban Calling Veggie Burgers “Veggie
Burgers,” VOX, (Sep. 6, 2019), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/9/6/20853246/mississippiveggie-burger-ban-laws-plant-based (discussing a Mississippi law that proscribed using labels
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the state interest in doing so is minimal or non-existent.22 There are
circuit splits concerning the commercial speech doctrine,23 and it is
unlikely the courts will find a uniform approach to food labeling
regulation. Therefore, legislators and regulators should take the lead in
imposing and enforcing food labeling regulations more uniformly.
With concern to consumer confusion, this Note proposes that
legislators should first look to how terms are understood by consumers
rather than by how the State defines them. If there is no common
understanding, the government should conduct surveys to determine if
there is actual confusion over the term before engaging in enforcement.
Outside of consumer confusion, legislators should focus on consumer
health when deciding to implement a regulation. They should
determine if the food product in question either contributes a harm or
reduces a benefit to consumer health. Once this determination is made,
legislators should address the issue through a commercial speech
restriction or a compelled disclosure. In both cases, they must use public
health data to ensure that their regulation advances the interest of
protecting health without violating the First Amendment rights of the
producer they are targeting. This Note advances this methodology as a
means of preventing unnecessary and costly litigation. Further, it may
promote more uniformity in how the commercial speech doctrine is
applied.
This Note will examine how the government can advance its
interests in protecting consumers without violating the First
Amendment rights of commercial speakers as outlined by the Court.
Part I will view the historic development and purpose of commercial
speech. Part II will examine the two methods the government uses to
advance its interest in the commercial speech context—restriction and
compulsion. Part III will discuss how the government identifies and
advances a governmental interest. Part IV will focus on why food
product label regulation is important. Part V will propose how
regulators and legislators should approach the regulation of food
product labels, guided by the prongs of Central Hudson.

such as “veggie burgers,” “vegan hot dog,” or “tofu bacon” on vegetarian products).
22. See Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (the
Arkansas bureau of standards litigating to maintain a regulation prohibiting the use of meat-based
names on plant-based products even when qualifiers such as “all vegan” are used on the product
to notify consumers it is plant-based).
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for the incongruous analyses of different
circuits.
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I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment,24 protects the freedom of speech.25 This
protection includes restricting the government from prohibiting speech
based on content in the public discourse.26 Justified by the idea that in
a democracy all citizens “have an equal right to influence the content
of public opinion, regardless of what they wish to say” the government
cannot be the arbiter of which views are legitimate and which are not.27
Until 1975, however, the First Amendment did not apply to commercial
speech.28 This changed after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bigelow
v. Virginia.29
In Bigelow, the appellant, Jeffrey C. Bigelow, was a newspaper
editor who published an advertisement for an organization in New
York that performed abortions.30 At the time of the advertisement’s
publication, Virginia law made it a misdemeanor for any publication to
encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion.31 Bigelow was
convicted for violating the law by publishing the advertisement.32 He
appealed, asserting among other claims that the statute violated the
First Amendment.33 His appeal reached the Supreme Court of Virginia,
which upheld the conviction because he “lacked a legitimate First
Amendment interest”34 given his “activity ‘was of a purely commercial
nature.’”35

24. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267–277 (1964) (holding that the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the First Amendment beyond the federal government,
and to the states, so Alabama could be in violation of its citizen’s freedom of speech and the
press).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. See Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 874 (2015)
(exploring the connection between public discourse and democracy, and the First Amendment
protections that extend to public discourse because of the connection).
27. Id. at 875.
28. See Wiersum, supra note 9, at 489 (discussing the historical development of commercial
speech protections under the First Amendment); see also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
54 (1942) (“the Constitution imposes no. . . restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising”).
29. See 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding that First Amendment protection is not lost because
the speech is in the form of paid commercial advertising).
30. Id. at 812.
31. Id. at 811.
32. Id. at 813.
33. Id. at 814.
34. Id. at 814 –15.
35. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815 (1975) (quoting Bigelow v. Commonwealth,
191 S.E.2d 173, 177 (Va. 1972)).
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The Supreme Court granted review of Bigelow’s case and
reversed.36 The Court reasoned that the “commercial aspects” of the
advertisement in Bigelow’s newspaper did not negate his First
Amendment guarantees.37 The existence of such commercial aspects
was not a sufficient reason for narrowing the protections afforded to
Bigelow by the First Amendment.38 The Court held that the Virginia
courts erred in assuming advertising was not entitled to First
Amendment protection and that “Bigelow had no legitimate First
Amendment interest.”39 Additionally, the Court held that the statute at
hand did not advance a legitimate state interest.40 In its discussion of
the State’s interests, the Court noted that there had been no claim that
“the advertisement was deceptive or fraudulent,” or “related to a
commodity or service that was then illegal.”41
The Court in Bigelow laid the groundwork for the development of
the commercial speech doctrine, but it did not give enough guidance
for enforcing the right. By recognizing a First Amendment interest in
commercial speech, the court afforded protection to those wanting to
advertise their goods and services.42 Still, the boundaries of this
protection were unclear. Under Bigelow, the government could
regulate commercial speech, so long as the legislation advanced a
legitimate governmental interest.43 The opinion did not give guidance
as to what constituted a legitimate governmental interest, other than
noting that the protection may not apply to advertising that is deceptive
or related to a product that is illegal.44
The Supreme Court solidified First Amendment protection of
commercial speech in another case involving Virginia law.45 In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc.,46
a Virginia resident and two nonprofit organizations challenged a code
36. Id. at 829.
37. Id. at 818
38. Id.
39. Id. at 825.
40. See id. at 827 (finding that Virginia has a legitimate interest in “maintaining the quality
of medical care within its borders,” but that there was no claim the advertisement in question
affected the quality of Virginia’s medical services).
41. Id. at 828.
42. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
43. See id. at 827.
44. See id. at 828.
45. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (holding commercial information protected by the First Amendment because of the
consumer’s interest in free flow of information).
46. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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which made advertising or affirmatively disseminating prescription
drug prices “effectively forbidden in the State.”47 The Court agreed that
“the State has a strong interest in maintaining . . . professionalism”
among pharmacists.48 The Court disagreed, however, that preventing
the advertising of prescription drug prices adequately advanced this
interest.49
In its opinion, the Court emphasized the importance of the “free
flow of commercial information.”50 Advertising is the dissemination of
information regarding “who is producing and selling what product, for
what reason, and at what price.”51 In an economy where the allocation
of resources will be made through numerous private decisions “it is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed.”52 Nondeceptive advertising generally
assists in informing the public.53 Therefore, “the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable”54 and the Court concluded
that commercial speech is protected.55 Though that is not to say
commercial speech cannot be regulated. The Court held that
untruthful, misleading, and illegal speech is not protected.56
Furthermore, the Court held that the State can ensure “that the stream
of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.”57
The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy opinion gave a concise
rationale for commercial speech. Informed economic decisions are
made more efficient when more information is available.58 Additionally,
the opinion set the outer limits for commercial speech protection—
untruthful, misleading, and illegal speech is not protected.59 The Court
also recognized a legitimate state interest in upholding the standards of

47. Id. at 752 –53.
48. Id. at 766.
49. See id. at 768. (disputing the harms connected to advertising and instead finding that
regulations in the pharmacy field protect professionalism and undermine the justifications for the
advertising ban).
50. Id. at 764.
51. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
52. Id.
53. See id. (describing the benefits that advertising can bring by informing the public).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 770.
56. See id. at 771 –72 (explaining that commercial speech protections have limits).
57. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748. 772
(1976).
58. See id. at 765.
59. See id. at 771 –72.
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a profession, although it struck down a law that did not adequately
advance that interest.60 Finding the balance between ensuring the free
flow of commercial information and advancing a governmental interest
remained unclear. The Court did not explain what governmental
interests are considered legitimate or what regulations are permissible
to advance those interests.
These first cases recognizing the commercial speech doctrine
demonstrate that commercial speech differs from other speech because
it is intended to “facilitate transactions in the marketplace” rather than
influence public opinion.61 In theory, a consumer with limited resources
will be able to achieve a higher degree of material satisfaction if she is
more informed about the economic choices in front of her.62
Advertising and labeling promote this goal by familiarizing consumers
with products.63 Such familiarity “serves to enhance market efficiency
and maximize consumer welfare.”64
There may be other reasons for protecting commercial speech that
extend past pure economics. Many consumers choose products due to
political or ethical motives.65 And in fact, “the most famous advertising
campaigns are also contributions to the tropes of public culture.”66 Still,
the predominant value of commercial speech is that it circulates
information about products to the public.67 Thus, “if the content of
commercial speech is inconsistent with this function, the speech fails to
serve its constitutional purpose” and may not be protected.68 When
commercial speech is consistent with its function, courts afford
protection.69

60. See id. at 776, 773.
61. Post, supra note 26, at 874.
62. See Redish, supra note 10, at 433 (explaining that commercial advertisement can provide
consumers with more information about products, and that such additional information will likely
lead to an increase in satisfaction with products they do buy).
63. Id.
64. Adler, supra note 12, at 429.
65. Id. at 430.
66. Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053,
1081 (2016) (arguing that protection of free expression is important to cultural democracy within
the increasing system of telecommunications).
67. See Post, supra note 26, at 875 (stating the value of commercial speech comes from
commercial speech’s “education of those who participate in the public discourse”).
68. Id.
69. See Wiersum, supra note 9, at 497 (discussing a theme from commercial speech cases,
where the court affords protection in order to prevent the government from “restricting
consumer’s access to information”).
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II. GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION: RESTRICTIONS AND
COMPULSIONS
When the government identifies commercial speech to regulate, it
can approach regulation in two ways—first, by restricting the speech,
or second, by compelling additional speech. In general, the First
Amendment protects individuals from both speech restrictions and
speech compulsions.70 Freedom of speech grants a speaker the right to
say what they want, as well as refrain from saying what they do not
want.71 There is no such symmetry of protection between restriction
and compulsion for commercial speech.72
A. Intermediate Scrutiny for Restrictions on Commercial Speech
The Constitution affords lesser protection to commercial speech
than other expression.73 For example, laws banning certain viewpoints
are “presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny.”74
This type of regulation alters public discourse by censoring opinion and
is considered nondemocratic.75 Comparatively, censoring commercial
speech does not alter the public discourse.76 The First Amendment’s
protection of commercial speech is based in its informational function;
the speech is valuable because it conveys a message about a commercial
product to consumers.77 Because commercial speech informs the public,
as opposed to altering the public discourse, the constitutionality of state
regulation is less strict than for other forms of expression.78 As such, the

70. See Post, supra note 26, at 876 (analogizing the protections on speech protections to
forced speech within the public discourse).
71. See id. at 875 –76 (“Compelled public discourse undermines democratic legitimation in
the same way, and to the same extent, as do restrictions on public discourse.”).
72. See id. at 877 (“[T]his symmetry does not exist within the domain of commercial
speech.”).
73. See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555,
558 –59 (2006) (discussing the confusion around commercial speech and the jurisprudential move
away from the interest of circulating information toward the interest of commercial speakers to
speak or to associate).
74. David L. Hudson Jr., Content Based, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, (2009)
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/935/content-based.
75. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1,
14 (2000) (arguing that it is a “necessary condition for democratic legitimacy” to have access to
the public discourse, and censorship of viewpoints inhibits such access).
76. See id. (describing commercial speech as instead “audience oriented”).
77. Wiersum, supra note 9, at 489 (listing “information conveyed by the speech” as one of
the competing interests when dealing with commercial speech).
78. See Post, supra note 26, at 876 (linking the permissive “content discrimination” in
commercial speech to its distance from the public discourse).
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state’s technique in regulating commercial speech must be in
proportion to a substantial governmental interest.79 Such regulatory
techniques must also be carefully designed to achieve the State’s
goals.80 This means that the state can only regulate speech which poses
a danger to its asserted interest, and it can only completely prohibit
speech when no narrower restrictions would serve its interest well.81
The controlling case for restrictions on commercial speech is
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.82
In Central Hudson, the Court faced the issue of whether a New York
regulation banning promotional advertising by an electrical utility
company violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.83 The New
York Court of Appeals upheld the regulation, finding the advertising
provided “little value in ‘the noncompetitive market in which utility
companies operate.’”84 Further, the advertising ban served the State’s
interests of conserving energy and maintaining lower electricity prices
for consumers.85 The Supreme Court agreed that New York’s concerns
with energy conservation and electricity rates constituted substantial
interests.86 It held, however, that the advertising ban went too far.87
The Supreme Court set forth a test for commercial speech
restrictions.88 This test has four prongs: (1) the expression must be
protected by the First Amendment, meaning it concerns lawful activity
and is not misleading; (2) the government’s asserted interest must be
substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the asserted
interest; and (4) the regulation may not be “more extensive than
necessary to serve the interest.”89 Although New York’s regulation
79. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
80. Id. at 564.
81. See id. at 565 (describing how the First Amendment requires governmental restrictions
on speech be “narrowly tailored”).
82. See Commercial Speech – Compelled Disclosures – D.C. Circuit Applies Less Stringent
Test to Compelled Disclosures – American Meat Institute v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(en banc), 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1526, 1526 (2015) (discussing how Central Hudson created an
intermediate scrutiny requirement for commercial speech restrictions).
83. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558.
84. Id. at 561 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 390 N.E.2d 749,
757 (N.Y. 1979)).
85. Id. at 559 –60 (New York electricity rates were not based on marginal cost at the time.
If the advertising resulted in more electricity consumption, production expenses would increase.
This increase would be subsidized by all consumers through generally higher rates).
86. Id. at 568 –69.
87. See id. at 569–70 (finding that the order was “more extensive than necessary” as it
“suppresses speech that in no way impairs the State’s interest”).
88. Id. at 566.
89. Id.
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directly advanced a substantial governmental interest, the State failed
to show that a more limited speech regulation would not advance its
interest.90 Therefore, New York’s complete suppression of the
advertising violated the First Amendment.91
This test solidifies the rationale the Court set forth in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy—that commercial speech ought to be protected
when it leads to “intelligent and well informed” consumer decisions.92
The first prong of the test also recognizes that commercial speech
merits lesser protection than other forms of speech.93 Outside of the
commercial speech context, for example, false speech is generally
protected.94 The Court’s test for restricting commercial speech is
reasonable on its face, though it has limited effects on commercial food
product labeling. Food products in the U.S. are available to customers
after approval from the FDA.95 This approval means that food product
labels generally do not relate to unlawful activity. Therefore, although
restrictions following Central Hudson may apply to misleading food
product labels, more commonly regulation is brought through
“compelled commercial speech.”96
B. Rational Basis Scrutiny for Compelled Commercial Speech
Compelled commercial speech generally refers to mandatory
disclosures in advertisements, on products, or elsewhere.97 Although the
First Amendment
normally
protects
individuals
against
governmentally compelled expression,98 this protection is weaker for
90. Id. at 570.
91. Id. at 571–72.
92. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
93. See Post, supra note 26, at 874 (distinguishing the protections given to commercial
speech from other types of speech due to commercial speech’s distance from the public forum).
94. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (striking down the Stolen
Valor Act which prohibited making false claims about receipt of military decorations and saying
“[t]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true”).
95. See How to Start a Food Business, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-industry/how-start-food-business#subject (May 13, 2021) (“FDA
regulates all foods and food ingredients introduced into or offered for sale in interstate
commerce. . ..”).
96. See Berman, supra note 19, at 59 (equating the “more relaxed” standard for commercial
speech as akin to rational basis review).
97. Id. at 55 –56 (quoting Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and
the Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 515 (2014)).
98. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 208 (2011) (“[T]he government will face high hurdles before it may compel
speakers to engage in certain types of expression. . . as the First Amendment grants a right against
compelled expression.”).
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commercial speech.99 Governments “frequently require the disclosure
of potentially relevant information about goods or services offered for
sale.”100 Examples of such potentially relevant information include
toxic chemical disclosures, nutritional labels, and cigarette warnings.101
The government’s power to compel disclosures of information about
goods or services “is substantial, but it is not without limits.”102 As it
stands, “legal doctrine—and legal scholarship—in this area remains
remarkably underdeveloped.”103 The leading case on compelled
commercial speech is Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court of Ohio.104
The appellant in Zauderer advertised legal services to women who
had suffered injuries resulting from the use of a contraceptive device.105
His advertisement violated a disciplinary rule requiring disclosure of
how legal costs would be handled if a client’s claim was unsuccessful.
106
The appellant contended that a Central Hudson analysis should be
applied to the rule; the State must show that his advertisement was false
or deceptive, or that the rule serves a “substantial governmental
interest other than preventing deception.”107 He also argued that the
State was required to show that the rule requiring disclosure directly
advanced a relevant interest, and constituted “the least restrictive
means of doing so.”108 The Supreme Court declined to apply Central
Hudson.109
The Court stated that there are “material differences between
disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech”—
reasoning that First Amendment protection of commercial speech is
based on the value of the information to consumers that commercial
speech provides.110 So the appellant’s interest “in not providing any

99. See Jennifer M. Keighly, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and
the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 546 (2012) (“Zauderer reduces the level of
scrutiny for compulsory factual disclosure laws targeting commercial speech.”).
100. Adler, supra note 12, at 424.
101. Goodman, supra note 13, at 515.
102. Adler, supra note 12, at 423.
103. Berman, supra note 19, at 54.
104. See 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding that commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment
protections, but less protection than given to noncommercial speech).
105. Id. at 630.
106. Id. at 633.
107. Id. at 650.
108. Id.
109. See id. (distinguishing between “disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on
speech” to justify declining to apply the Central Hudson test).
110. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650-
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particular factual information. . . is minimal.”111 As such, disclosure
requirements interfere “much more narrowly on an advertiser’s
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech.”112 Ohio had not
attempted to prevent information from being conveyed to the public,
instead it only required additional “factual and uncontroversial
information” be conveyed.113 The Court went on to say that this does
not mean disclosure requirements may never violate an advertiser’s
First Amendment rights,114 and that “unjustified or unduly burdensome
disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment.”115
The Court’s ruling in Zauderer exemplifies the asymmetrical
treatment of commercial speech restrictions and compulsions. The
rationale for protecting commercial speech is that providing more
information to consumers will aid their economic decisions.116
Regulations forcing producers to speak does not contradict this
rationale, whereas regulations restricting speech may.117 And in fact,
compelling commercial speech can provide more information to the
consuming public and so may actually advance the purpose of
commercial speech.118
III. IDENTIFYING AND ADVANCING A SUBSTANTIAL
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST.
The scope of governmental interests in regulating commercial
speech which may satisfy the Central Hudson test is unclear. Under
Central Hudson, commercial speech is not protected if it concerns
unlawful activity.119 Advertisements promoting the commission of a
crime, such as the sale of illicit drugs, can be prohibited by the
government. Similarly, there is no protection for commercial speech
that is misleading—Zauderer holds that there is a governmental
51 (1985).
111. Id. at 651.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
116. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976) (“So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”).
117. Post, supra note 26, at 877.
118. Id.
119. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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interest in “preventing deception.”120 But what governmental interests
apply to lawful, non-deceptive activity?
A. Identifying a Substantial Governmental Interest
The government has a clear interest in protecting the health of its
citizens.121 For this reason, “toxic chemical disclosures . . . and cigarette
warnings” are permissible regulations.122 Similarly, requiring disclosure
of the number of calories in a meal is useful for meeting the interest of
combating obesity.123 Nutritional labels are a ubiquitous medium for
informing consumers about the product they buy, and clearly advance
a governmental interest of protecting health. Other types of product
labeling have also been found to advance a governmental interest.124
In American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,125 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a federal statute
requiring country-of-origin labels on some meat products.126 The
asserted governmental interest for requiring these labels was to enable
consumers to make informed choices on the products they purchase.127
In particular, the government wanted consumers to know whether
there was “United States supervision of the entire production process
for health and hygiene.”128 Although the American Meat Institute
argued this governmental interest was inadequate to support
compelling the disclosure, the Court found the interest substantial.129
Similarly, a Vermont statute requiring manufacturers to inform
consumers their products contained mercury was upheld because the
government has an interest in protecting human health from mercury
poisoning.130 Outside of health concerns, courts have found other
interests, such as privacy and protecting consumers from fraud,

120. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
121. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a
statute compelling certain manufacturers to disclose that their product contained mercury did not
violate the First Amendment).
122. Goodman, supra note 13, at 515.
123. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 2009)
(upholding a New York City regulation requiring the disclosure of the caloric content of meals).
124. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(upholding a country-of-origin labeling rule for certain commodities).
125. 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
126. Id. at 27.
127. Id. at 23–24.
128. Id. at 24.
129. Id. at 23.
130. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2001).
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substantial as well.131
In Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox,132 the
Supreme Court dealt with a regulation prohibiting commercial
advertising on school property.133 Several interests were asserted in
support of this regulation: “promoting an educational rather than
commercial atmosphere on SUNY campuses, promoting safety and
security, preventing commercial exploitation of students, and
preserving residential tranquility.”134 The Supreme Court found these
interests substantial.135
B. Advancing a Substantial Governmental Interest
Once the government has asserted its interest in a commercial
speech case, it has the burden of justifying its regulation.136 To satisfy
this burden for a restriction of speech, the government “must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restrictions
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”137 There is a lesser
burden for compelled commercial speech, as “the First Amendment
interests implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially
weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed.”138 For
example, disclosure requirements to prevent deception must
reasonably relate to that goal.139 For both restriction and disclosure
requirements, the government must show that its regulations are
narrowly tailored.140 While this may seem straightforward, in practice,
it is not.

131. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993) (disallowing a Florida ban on in-person
solicitation by certified public accountants for violating the First Amendment, while finding
substantial state interests in protecting consumers from fraud or overreaching by CPAs as well as
protecting the privacy of potential clients).
132. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
133. See id. at 471–73 (reversing an appellate court’s decision which held that a public
university must use the least restrictive means in prohibiting commercial advertising on campus).
134. Id. at 475.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 770.
137. Id. at 770 –71.
138. Zauderer v. Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985)
(emphasis added).
139. Id. at 651.
140. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting
that compelled disclosures must pass narrow tailoring only if they advance an interest outside of
Central Hudson’s first prong, though disclosures meant to prevent deception must only pass a
reasonable relation test); see also id. at 651 (“We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome
disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial
speech.”).
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In 2010, Congress adopted Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.141 This section required
firms to investigate and disclose the origins of minerals they were
using.142 Reporting companies were required to disclose whether they
used conflict minerals on their websites and in reports to the SEC.143
The SEC’s interest under the statute was to alleviate the crisis in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.144 Although the SEC attempted to
achieve this goal by compelling disclosures, the Appellate Court for the
District of Columbia found that the regulation was outside the bounds
of commercial speech.145 This requirement “compelled disclosures that
are unconnected to advertising or product labeling at the point of sale,”
and so Zauderer did not apply.146 The court went further, saying even if
Zauderer applied, the government would not have met its burden.147
The argument that having reporting companies disclose whether their
minerals were conflict free would reduce the humanitarian crisis in the
DRC was “entirely unproven and rest[ed] on pure speculation.”148 The
court’s ruling demonstrates that in regulating commercial speech, the
government’s task is beyond simply identifying an interest. The
government must demonstrate how its regulation relates to and
advances its named interest in connection with the labeling or
advertising of a product.
The Supreme Court has also ruled speech restrictions do not
automatically pass muster just because they target speech pertaining to
“vice” activities.149 In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,150 the Court
struck down a statute prohibiting advertisements of the price of
alcoholic beverages.151 Rhode Island argued that the restriction would
significantly advance its interest in promoting “temperance,” which the

141. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
142. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a rule
requiring issuers to post on their website whether their products were “DRC conflict free”
violated the First Amendment).
143. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
144. Id. at 524.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 522, 524.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 525.
149. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513–14 (1996) (holding that
Rhode Island’s statute banning the advertising of prices for alcoholic beverages violated the First
Amendment).
150. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
151. Id. at 489.
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Court took to mean reducing alcohol consumption.152 Rhode Island
failed to produce any evidentiary support that banning alcohol price
advertising would advance this interest.153 Further, there was no
evidence that without the ban alcohol consumption would significantly
increase; to conclude so would be the type of “speculation or
conjecture” that does not warrant upholding a restriction.154 The Court
went further, saying the State’s argument that speech restrictions
targeting “vice” activities should be upheld was “unpersuasive.”155 A
state legislature could potentially label any product that poses some
threat to public health or morals as a “vice.”156 Accepting this argument
would “allow[] state legislatures to justify censorship by the simple
expedient of placing the ‘vice’ label on selected lawful activities.”157
This reasoning is similar to that used in Ocheesee Creamery—allowing
the state to define terms and then regulate speech in conflict with those
definitions would permit the state to regulate speech without
restraint.158 Such a regulatory scheme would eviscerate the protections
afforded by commercial speech.
The clear link between food consumption and consumer health
does not mean that all product labels meet a substantial governmental
interest. For example, in International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy,159
the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to deny a
preliminary injunction against a statute which required dairy producers
to identify products derived from cows “treated with a synthetic growth
hormone.”160 The FDA had already “concluded that [the hormone] has
no appreciable effect on the composition of milk produced by treated
cows, and that there are no human safety or health concerns.”161 Instead
of an interest in protecting health, Vermont argued the statute
advanced a “strong consumer interest and the public’s ‘right to
know.’”162 The Second Circuit disagreed, saying the desire to know
which products were treated with synthetic hormones “is insufficient to
152. Id. at 504.
153. Id. at 505.
154. Id. at 507.
155. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513 (1996)
156. Id. at 514.
157. Id.
158. See Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1240 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
State was unable to show that forbidding the Creamery from using the term ‘skim milk’ was
reasonable, and not more extensive than necessary to serve its interest.”).
159. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
160. Id. at 69.
161. Id. at 73.
162. Id. (quoting Int’l Dairy Foods v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp 246, 249 (D. Vt. 1995)).
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permit the State . . . to compel the dairy manufacturers to speak against
their will.”163
IV. FOOD PRODUCT LABELING
Legislators are in the best position to enact a more coherent scheme
for food product label regulation. Regulating food safety is important,
and “governments have played a role in maintaining the integrity of
their countries’ food supply for thousands of years, from Roman
statutes targeting the adulteration of food through the English assizes
of 1266.”164 In the United States, even after a food product meets FDA
standards, the government can continue to regulate it through
commercial speech restrictions and disclosures.165 Commercial speech
“represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear
expression about goods and services and the right of government to
regulate the sales of such goods and services.”166 Currently, courts
inconsistently apply the commercial speech doctrine. Likewise,
commentators disagree about commercial speech’s desirability and
efficacy. Some believe that “[i]n recent years . . . governments have
imposed broader disclosure requirements.”167 Others think that
“restrictions on commercial speech are currently subject to a de facto
strict scrutiny applied under the Central Hudson name.”168
For food labeling regulations, the uncertainty and inconsistency of
court rulings often leads to needless litigation. Florida’s regulation on
Vitamin A content in skim milk caused Mary Lou Wesselhoeft to cease
selling her product for five years.169 For three of those years, she was
involved in a legal battle.170 Furthermore, in 2019, Mississippi passed a
law prohibiting plant-based products from being labeled meat or meat
food products.171 This law prevented labels such as “veggie burgers,”
“vegan hot dog,” or “tofu bacon.”172 A similar law passed in Arkansas,
163. Id. at 74.
164. Wiersum, supra note 9, at 486.
165. See Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2017).
166. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 –15 (2d ed. 1988)).
167. Adler, supra note 12, at 424.
168. Wiersum, supra note 9, at 488.
169. Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2017).
170. Censored in Florida: Creamery Owner Sues to End Labeling Censorship, INSTITUTE FOR
JUSTICE, https://ij.org/case/florida-skim-milk/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
171. “Veggie Burger” Labeling Ban Presents Meaty First Amendment Case, IN A CROWDED
THEATER, (July 18, 2019), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2019/07/18/veggie-burger-labelingban-presents-meaty-first-amendment-case/.
172. Kelsey Piper, Mississippi Will No Longer Ban Calling Veggie Burgers “Veggie Burgers,”
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known as Act 501, required plant-based food manufacturers to change
their labeling of meatless burgers and sausages to other labels, such as
“savory plant-based protein” or “veggie tubes.”173 Arguably, a term like
“veggie burger” is more descriptive than “savory plant-based protein.”
One might hope legislatures would therefore worry about potential
consumer confusion before drafting such statutes. Instead, lawsuits
were filed in Mississippi and Arkansas to challenge these statutes.174
Mississippi withdrew its regulations and proposed new ones which
allow plant-based food producers to continue selling with labels that
qualify their products with terms such as “meatless,” or “vegetarian.”175
Arkansas, however, chose to litigate the matter and subsequently lost a
preliminary injunction.176 Arkansas’s purported interest in its law was
to protect consumers from being confused or misled.177 The judge for
the Eastern District of Arkansas did not buy the argument that the
statute would prevent consumer confusion. Under the State’s logic, “a
reasonable consumer might also believe that veggie bacon contains
pork, that flourless chocolate contains flour, or that e-books are made
out of paper.”178 The Eastern District of Arkansas seems to think the
State’s law is preempted by consumer common sense.179 The opinion
demonstrates that some type of reform is needed in how commercial
speech for food labels is regulated. Without reform, needless resources
will be wasted regulating labels that are not unlawful, misleading, or
harmful to consumers.

VOX, (Sep. 6, 2019), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/9/6/20853246/mississippi-veggieburger-ban-laws-plant-based
173. Beth Mole, Judge Serves Up Sizzling Rebuke of Arkansas’ Anti-Veggie-Meat Labeling
Law, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 12, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/12/judge-serves-upsizzling-rebuke-of-arkansas-anti-veggie-meat-labelinglaw/#:~:text=A%20federal%20judge%20on%20Tuesday,each%20individual%20label%20in%2
0violation.
174. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Upton’s Nats. Co. v. Bryant, No.
3:19-cv-462-HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. 2019) (seeking a preliminary injunction and declaratory
judgment against the act); See also Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 570
(E.D. Ark. 2019) (granting a preliminary injunction against an act regulating the labeling of plantbased foods for violating the First Amendment).
175. Piper, Mississippi Will No Longer Ban Calling Veggie Burgers “Veggie Burgers.”
176. Mole, Judge Serves Up Sizzling Rebuke of Arkansas’ Anti-Veggie-Meat Labeling Law.
177. Turtle Island, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 563.
178. Id. at 574 (quoting Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co., No. 13-cv-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013)).
179. See id.
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V. CLARIFYING CENTRAL HUDSON TOWARDS MORE REASONABLE
REGULATION FOR FOOD PRODUCT LABELING

Change in food labeling regulations should come from legislators
and regulators, not the courts.180 As mentioned, courts vary in how they
interpret the commercial speech doctrine.181 Moreover, litigation is
timely and expensive. Resources can be used more efficiently if
litigation is avoided, especially, as the Eastern District of Arkansas
seems to believe, if the matter is common sense. To prevent commercial
speech issues from reaching the courts, legislators and regulators
should make changes to how they approach food labeling regulations.
A way to enact change is to re-evaluate how the prongs of Central
Hudson should be applied to food labels when writing or enforcing
commercial speech regulations.
A. Unlawful and Misleading
The first part of the Central Hudson test is easily applied to food
labels. Central Hudson does not afford First Amendment protection to
commercial speech that is misleading or related to unlawful activity.182
Food products sold in the United States are subject to regulation. The
“FDA regulates all foods and food ingredients introduced into or
offered for sale in interstate commerce, with the exception of meat,
poultry, and certain processed egg products regulated by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.”183 Further, retail food establishments, such
as restaurants, food trucks and grocery stores, are regulated by state and
local governments.184 Thus, the focus of Central Hudson’s first prong
need not be placed on whether labels placed on food products apply to
lawful activity. The government should instead focus on whether the
labels are misleading.
The government should not defer to its own definitions when
deciding if a food label is misleading. The government can, and does,
define the permissible meaning of terms regarding food. Federal
regulations define terms such as “fresh,” “natural flavor,” and

180. Legislators and regulators are in a position to enact and enforce regulation in a
reasonable manner which will likely lead to a more economic use of resources.
181. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
182. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. at 566.
183. How to Start a Food Business, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-industry/how-start-food-business#subject (last visited Oct. 17,
2021).
184. Id.
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“organic.”185 These definitions, however, should not be dispositive.186 In
fact, a judge has described the federal food labelling guidelines as
“complex.”187 Moreover, “there is ‘no extrinsic evidence that the
perceptions of ordinary consumers align with these various labeling
standards.’”188
Regulators should look to the colloquially understood meaning of
words before resorting to the government’s definitions. The Ocheesee
litigation was prompted by DACS enforcing a law based on Florida’s
definition of “skim milk.” 189 The litigation could have been avoided if
DACS based its decision to bring enforcement on how consumers
understand skim milk rather than how the statute defined it. People do
not commonly believe that “veggie burgers” contain meat, just as they
do not believe “e-books are made out of paper.”190 Additionally, some
industries already self-police their product naming.
The American Bourbon Association lists specific requirements that
must be met for whiskey to be considered “bourbon.” Among them are
that the liquor product is distilled at no higher than 160 proof, is made
from a minimum of fifty one percent corn, rye, wheat and malted barley,
and is aged in charred oak barrels.191 The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and
Trade Bureau’s regulations regarding distilled spirits codifies these
requirements in its identification of “bourbon whiskey.”192 Regulating
bourbon is thus different than the regulation of skim milk in Mary
Lou’s case. If someone labels a product “bourbon” without meeting the

185. Adler, supra note 12, at 438 –39 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 101.95(a) (2015); 21 C.F.R. §
101.22(a)(3) (2015); 7 C.F.R. § 205.301 (2015)).
186. See Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1238 –39 (11th Cir. 2017)
(reasoning that differing from the State’s definition of “skim milk” is inherently misleading).
187. Wynn v. Topco Assocs., LLC, No. 19-CV-11104 (RA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9714, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2021) (dismissing a class action suit claiming that the use of “Vanilla” in
“Vanilla Almondmilk” misleads consumers because reasonable consumers would expect the
flavoring to come from real vanilla ).
188. Id. (quoting N. Am. Olive Oil Ass’n v. Kangadis Food Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519
(S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
189. See Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
Creamery filed its complaint . . . contending the State’s refusal to allow it to call its product “skim
milk” amounted to censorship in violation of the First Amendment.”).
190. Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 574 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (quoting
Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co., No. 13-cv-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013)).
BOURBON
ASSOCIATION,
191. What
is
Bourbon,
AMERICAN
https://americanbourbonassociation.com/bourbon-what-is.
192. 27 CFR § 5.22(b)(1)(i) (2018) (defining “bourbon whisky” as “whisky produced at not
exceeding 160° proof from a fermented mash of not less than 51 percent corn, rye, wheat, malted
barley, or malted rye grain, respectively, and stored at not more than 125° proof in charred new
oak containers”).
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standards, regulators could file an injunction to halt the labeling. Such
enforcement would be justified not because the product fails to meet
the government’s definition, but because consumers have independent
expectations about bourbon. To label the product “bourbon” without
meeting these expectations would therefore be misleading, because the
product would differ from the colloquial understanding of what
“bourbon” is.
Colloquial understandings, however, may not always be clear. If the
government believes a term is misleading, it can conduct surveys to
determine how consumers understand the term. In the Ocheesee
litigation, the State conducted such a study which produced “no
evidence that consumers expected anything other than skim milk when
they read those words on the Creamery’s bottles.”193 Florida and Mary
Lou would have been better served if the study was conducted before
litigation commenced. Thus, to promote efficiency, regulators should
test consumer understanding of food labels before they decide to
enforce a regulation.194 Regulators could test consumer understanding
of food labels using questionnaires or surveys such as the one
conducted during the Ocheesee litigation. These surveys would better
help the government understand if a food product label misleads
consumers or differs from their expectations. Regulators should
proceed with enforcement only if the number of consumers misled
passes a certain threshold.195
B. Governmental Interest: Differentiating Harms and Benefits
As protecting consumers from deception is a strong governmental
interest, so too is maintaining the health of citizens. It is difficult to
navigate when and how regulating food labels meets this interest. In
regulating a food label, the pertinent question legislators and regulators
should ask is how consumption of that particular food product effects
consumer health. An important distinction should be made as to
whether consumption, and the expectations along with consumption,
lead to harms or benefits.
“Harm” is a vague word that is difficult to pin down. For the
purposes of this Note, “harm” means “physical damage.”196 Using this
193. Ocheesee Creamery, 851 F.3d at 1239.
194. Testing consumer understanding of food product labels to see if they are confusing is
likely to be less expensive than pursuing litigation.
195. It is beyond the scope of this Note to determine where this threshold should lie.
196. See Harm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/harm
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definition, a food product can be described as harmful if its
consumption leads to, or has the potential to lead to, the physical
damage of health. A substantial governmental interest exists where the
government wishes to reduce or prevent harms from occurring. A
“benefit” is “something that produces good or helpful results or effects
or that promotes well-being.”197 For food products, determining harms
and benefits may appear tricky at first glance because harms and
benefits are often intertwined and opposite. For example, consuming
broccoli has been found to “lower[] the risk of cardiovascular disease
by reducing the total amount of cholesterol in the body.”198 Consuming
broccoli is therefore beneficial to health in that it reduces the chance
of harm. In the realm of commercial speech, the government should
focus on addressing food labels for harmful products rather than for
products which lack benefits.
Obesity may be used to exemplify this point. Obesity increases the
risk for serious health conditions such a stroke, heart disease, diabetes,
cancer, and death.199 These conditions damage health, and so obesity
may be characterized as a harm. Accordingly, the Second Circuit in New
York State Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board Of Health,200 found
that New York City had an interest in preventing obesity.201 Legislators
and regulators should distinguish between preventing harms, such as
those caused by obesity, and losing benefits when regulating food
labels. Consuming meals without knowing their caloric content may
contribute to a harm, whereas consuming milk without Vitamin A may
not.
Consuming Vitamin A confers several health benefits, such as
regulating cell growth and supporting eye health.202 Vitamin A is found
in a variety of food products including tomatoes, cantaloupe, spinach,
(last visited Oct. 17, 2021) (defining harm as “physical or mental damage”).
197. Benefit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/benefit
(last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
198. Nicola Shubrook, Top Five Health Benefits of Broccoli, BBC (citing Talwinder Singh
Kahlon et al., Steam Cooking Significantly Improves in vitro Bile Acid Binding of Collard Greens,
Kale, Mustard Greens, Broccoli, Green Bell Pepper, and Cabbage, 28 NUTRITIONAL RESEARCH
no.
6,
2008,
at
151),
https://www.bbcgoodfood.com/howto/guide/health-benefitsbroccoli#:~:text=Broccoli%20is%20a%20good%20source,B%20vitamins%20including%20folic
%20acid (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
199. The Health Effects of Overweight & Obesity, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/effects/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
200. 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
201. See Id. at 134 –35.
202. Vitamin A, HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/vitamin-a/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
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kale, pumpkin, and milk.203 Milk containing Vitamin A therefore
confers some benefits to consumers. The process of skimming milk
removes most of the milk’s Vitamin A content unless replaced by an
additive.204 Thus, skim milk with no additives potentially deprives
consumers of some potential benefits. It cannot be said, however, that
removing the Vitamin A from milk harms consumers in any way similar
to the harms of obesity.205 Certainly, there are risks associated with
Vitamin A deficiency, such as susceptibility to infections and
infertility.206 Such risks are unlikely to manifest, however, as “Vitamin
A deficiency is rare in Western countries.”207 Further, it is unlikely that
consumers rely on milk to meet their daily Vitamin A intake.
Of course, a different conclusion would be reached if there was
evidence that the public depended on milk for the majority of its
Vitamin A consumption. In that case, removing the Vitamin A from
milk could potentially lead to the harms associated with Vitamin A
deficiency. In this scenario, instead of a lack of benefit, there would be
harm from not including additives when selling skim milk to the public.
The government would then have a higher interest in regulating the
labels for skim milk. If the government had such concerns, legislators
could conduct surveys similar to those mentioned above to understand
how the public consumes food products. If such a survey found
consumers rely on skim milk for their Vitamin A intake, the
government would have a substantial interest in regulating skim milk
labeling. Legislators would then be justified in passing commercial
speech regulation for skim milk labels such as compelling those without
Vitamin A to use the label “imitation milk product.”208 As it stands,
however, removing Vitamin A from skim milk and not replacing it with
artificial additives poses no serious danger to public health. Further, if
an individual is concerned about her personal vitamin consumption,
she can still look at the nutrition facts on the skim milk.209

203. Id.
204. Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2017).
205. National Institute of Health, Vitamin A: Fact Sheet for Health Professionals,
https://ods.od.nih.gov/factsheets/VitaminA-Consumer/.
206. Vitamin A, supra note 202.
207. Id.
208. See Ocheesee Creamery, 851 F.3d at 1232 (“imitation milk product” was one label
Florida suggested Mary Lou use).
209. Jayachandran N. Variyama, Do Nutritional Labels Improve Dietary Outcomes?, 17
HEALTH ECON. 695 (2008) (examining how mandatory nutrition labels impacts consumer diets).
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C. Advancing the Interest through Restricting or Compelling Speech
Once policymakers have identified a harm related to food labels,
they must decide how to advance that governmental interest. An
important consideration is whether the interest should be advanced
through a speech restriction or a compelled disclosure. The commercial
speech doctrine imposes intermediate scrutiny for restrictions of
speech under Central Hudson. There is a lesser standard for compelled
commercial speech under Zauderer. In making their decision,
legislators should keep in mind that the main purpose of commercial
speech is “the free flow of commercial information.”210 Legislation that
runs counter to this purpose will likely not pass scrutiny if it is litigated
in a court. Compelling commercial speech is therefore preferable to
restricting it. Regulations which compel a speaker to disgorge more
information to the public not only align with the purpose of commercial
speech, but also “may even enhance it.”211 Conversely, restricting
commercial speech lessens the information available for consumers to
make economic decisions. Legislators therefore should enact
commercial speech restrictions more sparingly than speech
compulsions.
After deciding whether to enact a commercial speech restriction or
compelled disclosure, legislators should ensure that their choice of
regulation will not be overturned by the courts. Policymakers should
consider that the government has the burden of justifying its regulation
and “must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”212 Further,
the government cannot rely on “speculation and conjecture” when
implementing a restriction on speech.213 Therefore, it should evaluate
data on the harms and benefits of the food products it is labeling and
identify how its regulation will advance that interest.
Under the theory advanced in this Note, legislators have more
leeway to advance regulations for food products that contribute to a
harm. An asserted interest in preventing allergic reactions is more
likely to be substantial than an asserted interest in increasing Vitamin
A consumption. Using New York Restaurant Ass’n as an example again,

210.
(1976).
211.
212.
213.

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764
Post, supra note 26, at 877.
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 –71 (1993).
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996).
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New York City’s stated interest was combating obesity.214 The City
provided the Court with studies outlining the harms to health
associated with obesity.215 Moreover, the City identified that obesity is
linked to excess calorie consumption and provided studies showing that
giving consumers calorie information allows for healthier decisions
which may reduce obesity levels.216 New York City did not rely on
speculation, but rather on data. In doing so, its regulation was upheld.
Because the government was concerned with a harm, it likely could
have chosen to restrict speech rather than compel it. An informative
example of how such a restriction would work comes from Ireland.
In September 2020, Ireland’s Supreme Court ruled that the food
chain Subway could not describe its bread as “bread.”217 An Irish
statute defining bread prohibited bread from having sugar, fat, and
bread improver content over two percent the weight of flour.218 In
Subway’s recipe, the sugar weighed ten percent the weight of flour.219
This speech restriction makes sense using harm as a guide in the
commercial speech analysis. Normally, the government should not
exclusively look to its own definition when considering regulations on
the commercial speech of food labels. If, however, not adhering to the
definition would increase the risk of a harm, then it is acceptable to use
that definition in regulating the commercial speech. The same does not
apply to a food label case dealing with benefits.
In Ocheesee, the lack of Vitamin A in Mary Lou’s skim milk was the
only health concern at issue. The State’s interest in its regulation was
the milk’s lack of health benefits due to skimming, and not any
potential harm. This interest is not substantial, and so it did not merit
the restriction Florida imposed. Florida may have been concerned with
a discrepancy of benefits between milk containing additives and milk
without additives. The State may have wanted consumers to know that
Mary Lou’s skim milk contained less Vitamin A than skim milk from
other sources. If this was the case, Florida would have been better
suited compelling Mary Lou to disclose the lack of Vitamin A on her
214. N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 134 –35 (2d Cir. 2009).
215. Id.
216. See id. at 134-36 (“[T]he obesity epidemic is mainly due to excess calorie
consumption . . . consumers’ distorted perceptions about how many calories food contained led
to unhealthy food choices.”).
217. Reese Oxner, For Subway, A Ruling Not So Sweet. Irish Court Says Its Bread Isn’t Bread,
NPR (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/01/919189045/for-subway-a-ruling-not-sosweet-irish-court-says-its-bread-isnt-bread.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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product label rather than pursuing a speech restriction. This course of
action would be preferable to a restriction, as there would be more
information available to consumers. Additionally, the State likely
would have been able to show a link between its interest and a
disclosure requirement. If a food product has no potential health harms
or lack of benefits, however, policymakers and regulators should not
attempt commercial speech regulation.
Legislators and regulators can save resources by not attempting to
regulate food products which do not pose any potential health effects.
In International Dairy, the State attempted to compel dairy farmers to
disclose whether their products had been treated with synthetic growth
hormone.220 The FDA had already concluded that there were no human
safety or health concerns from the food products procured by the
treated cows.221 There was no discernable potential harm from the
product, nor was there any lack of benefit or other types of benefit
discrepancy. The protections afforded by commercial speech prohibit
the government from compelling producers to speak against their will
without a legitimate interest.222 Consumer curiosity alone is not enough
to permit a forced disclosure.223 Nor should it be.
Beyond simply correcting deception, policymakers should only
advance commercial speech regulations on food labels if those
regulations pertain to public health. Food products relate to public
health through potential harm, or through potential lack of benefit. For
mitigating harms, the State has a substantial interest. And so,
legislatures will have leeway to pursue either commercial speech
restrictions, or compelled disclosures. There is a lesser health interest in
lack of benefit cases, and so legislatures may only pursue compelled
disclosures. Once legislatures have decided on a restriction or
compulsion, they must use data to ensure that their policy effectively
advances their interest.
CONCLUSION
Commercial speech is afforded lesser First Amendment protection
than other speech. Protections around commercial speech are still

220. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996).
221. Id. at 73.
222. See id. at 74 (“Although the Court is sympathetic to the Vermont consumers who wish
to know which products may derive from rBST-treated herds, their desire is insufficient to permit
the State of Vermont to compel the dairy manufacturers to speak against their will.”).
223. Id.
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valuable in that they promote the free flow of commercial information
allowing consumers to allocate their resources efficiently. Since its
inception in 1975, the doctrine of commercial speech has caused
confusion. There is disagreement about what constitutes misleading
speech, what a substantial governmental interest is, and what directly
advancing an interest entails.
Legislators and regulators are in the best position to clear up the
commercial speech doctrine. By adhering closely to the prongs of
Central Hudson, and focusing on harms, legislators can enact
regulations that will not be struck down by courts. Similarly, by using
surveys to discern consumer confusion and by identifying substantial
governmental interests, regulators can better identify which cases will
be successful if they decide to pursue regulating a food product label.
These changes will reduce needless litigation, thereby promoting more
efficient use of government resources.

